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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wayne D. Anderson, II, appeals from the district court's order denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He also appeals from the sentence imposed 
upon his guilty plea to lewd conduct with a minor under 16 years of age. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A member of Anderson's family reported to Nampa police that Anderson 
was sexually abusing his daughter. (PSI, p.2.) Police contacted Anderson's 
wife, who reported that two of their daughters told her of sexual abuse 
perpetrated on them by Anderson. (ld.) Police interviewed both daughters. (Id.) 
Seventeen-year-old D.A. told police that her father had been touching her 
inappropriately for several months. (PSI, p.2.) D.A. reported that Anderson 
would touch her breasts, at first on top of her clothes, but then under her shirt 
and bra. (ld.) Later, he began putting his hand on her crotch over her clothes. 
(Id.) The abuse eventually progressed to manual-to-genital contact under D.A.'s 
clothes. (Id.) D.A. began kicking Anderson or moving away anytime Anderson 
sat down next to her. (PSI attachment, pA8.) Anderson told D.A. that if she ever 
told her church bishop about the abuse, that both he and D.A.'s mother would go 
to jail. (Id.) 
Thirteen-year-old C.A. told police that Anderson put his hand down her 
pants and underwear while she was sleeping. (PSI, p.2.) Anderson left when 
C.A. told him to go away, but he returned to her bedroom on another occasion, 
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rubbed her leg, and said, "Can't we just playa bit?" (PSI attachment, p.45.) 
C.A. kicked Anderson, who eventually left. (Id.) 
Officers then interviewed Anderson. (PSI, pp.2-3; PSI attachment, pp.51-
52.) Anderson confessed to touching D.A. multiple times on her breasts and 
vagina, and to penetrating D.A.'s vagina with his finger on one occasion whiie 
D.A. was sleeping. (PSI attachment, p.51.) Anderson also stated that he had 
been "grooming" D.A. for some time, and that the abuse started when she was 
13 or 14 years old. (PSI, p.3; PSI attachment, pp.51-52.) 
The state charged Anderson with lewd contact with a minor under 16, sex 
abuse of a child under 18, and a sentencing enhancement for being a repeat 
sexual offender pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520G. (R., pp.6-9.) While he was in 
custody awaiting trial, Anderson wrote a letter asking his wife to prevent their 
daughters from testifying. (PSI attachment, pp.115-116, 118.) Shortly before the 
scheduled trial date, Anderson and the state reached a plea agreement. (R., 
pp.76-82.) Anderson entered an Alford plea to lewd conduct and the repeat 
sexual offender sentencing enhancement, and the state agreed to recommend a 
fixed sentence of no more than the mandatory minimum 15 years. (R., pp.76-82; 
2/14/12 Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.24, L.24.) The state also agreed to dismiss the sex 
abuse charge, and to not file an additional charge of intimidation of a witness for 
the letter Anderson sent to his wife from jail. (R., p.78; 2/14/12 Tr., p.6, L.17 -
p.9, L.12.) 
Prior to sentencing, Anderson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
(R., pp.83-85, 90-94.) Anderson asserted that his plea was involuntary because 
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it was coerced by his wife, and because he was "completely devastated mentally 
and emotionally." (R., pp.83-85, 90-94; 4/9/12 Tr., p.6, L.7 - p.10, L.12; 4/16/12 
Tr., p.2, L.7 - p.5, L.13.) After two hearings, the district court denied Anderson's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and his subsequent motion for 
reconsideration. (R., pp.97-101, 105-107; 7/16/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-16.) 
The district court imposed a unified 40-year sentence with 15 years fixed. 
(R., pp.117-118.) Anderson timely appealed. (R., pp.119-122.) 
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ISSUES 
Anderson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it did not 
permit Mr. Anderson to withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of forty years, with fifteen years fixed, upon 
Mr. Anderson following his plea of guilty to lewd conduct? 
(Appellant's brief, p.9) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Anderson failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Has Anderson failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 




Anderson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Anderson contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-17.) 
Specifically, Anderson contends that the district court erred because his wife's 
coercion and his depression rendered his guilty plea constitutionally involuntary, 
or constituted just cause for the withdrawal of his plea. (Id.) A review of the 
record and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that 
Anderson failed to carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was 
involuntary, or that there existed any other just reason entitling him to withdraw 
his plea. Anderson has thus failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775,780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358,362,941 
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159,15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Denving Anderson's 
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is 
imposed. LC.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an 
automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 
284 (1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535,211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears 
the burden of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. kL.; 
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,374-75,825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must 
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 
111 (1991); Hansiovan, 121 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State v. Rodriguez, 
118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). If the plea was 
voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must determine whether 
other reasons exist to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Hansiovan, 121 
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. The decision to grant or deny a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court. kL. at 535, 211 
P.3d at 780. "[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant's 
assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial 
court to decide." kL., 147 Idaho at 537,211 P.3d at 782. 
In this case, the district court correctly rejected Anderson's contention that 
family pressure and depression rendered his guilty plea constitutionally 
involuntary. (R., pp.97-101.) It also properly utilized its discretion in determining 
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that these factors did not otherwise constitute just cause for the withdrawal of his 
plea. (Id.) 
It is well-established that family pressure not attributed to the state does 
not render a confession constitutionally involuntary. Hanslovan, 121 Idaho at 
537-538,211 P.3d at 782-783 ("anxiety and pressure from the defendant's family 
situation do not constitute impermissible coercion") (citing State v. Spry, 127 
Idaho 107, 111, 897 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 
926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995»). In State v. Nath, 141 Idaho 584, 
586, 114 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005), the defendant argued that his guilty plea 
was constitutionally involuntary because pleading guilty was the only option that 
would allow him to be released to take care of his wife and mother, who were 
both unable to care for themselves. The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected his 
argument, concluding that "[b]ecause Nath's personal family circumstances were 
not attributable to the State, they likewise do not render his plea invalid or 
coerced." 19.: at 586, 114 P.3d at 144 (citing Politte v. United States, 852 F.2d 
924, 930 (yth Cir. 1988)). 
Further, Anderson's change of plea hearing contained a lengthy plea 
colloquy designed to ensure the voluntariness of his plea. (2/14/12 Tr., p.9, L.9-
p.24, L.14.) The district court asked Anderson whether anyone had made any 
threats against him, or utilized any coercion or inducements to cause him to 
plead guilty, and Anderson responded in the negative. (2/14/12 Tr., p.16, LS.6-
13.) The court also advised Anderson that it was "highly unlikely" that it would 
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea once he entered it, and Anderson stated he 
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understood. (2/14/12 Tr., p.23, Ls.22-2S.) In his written guilty plea advisory 
form, Anderson indicated there was no reason he would be unable to make 
reasoned and informed decisions regarding this case. (R., p.78.) 
Additionally, there is no indication in the record that any undiagnosed 
"depression" asserted by Anderson rose to a level that rendered his guilty plea 
constitutionally involuntary. While Anderson alleged that he was hospitalized in a 
mental facility for three days following a suicide attempt shortly prior to his arrest 
(4/9/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-16; PSI attachment, ppA-7), he has not demonstrated that 
any mental health issue compromised the voluntariness of his guilty plea six 
months later. It is notable that despite this hospitalization and access to 
healthcare professionals, Anderson was not diagnosed with a mental illness. In 
fact, Anderson has never been diagnosed with a mental illness, and was not 
prescribed any medication at the time of his guilty plea. (R., p.78.) Anderson did 
not inform the district court of any mental or emotional issues during the change 
of plea hearing, nor did he request that a competency or mental health evaluation 
be conducted. (See 2/14/12 Tr.) While stress and undiagnosed "depression" no 
doubt often accompany arrests for serious felonies, they do not automatically and 
indefinitely render defendants incapable of entering valid guilty pleas. 
Anderson has also failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion in determining that the above factors did not constitute other "just 
cause" for the withdrawal of his plea. Anderson did not allege that his wife 
compelled his guilty plea through some sort of threat; he asserted only that his 
wife expressed a strong desire that he plead guilty. (R., pp.83-8S, 90-94, 10S-
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107.) Where a defendant victimizes members of his own family, it is not 
surprising that another family member would prefer that the case be resolved 
prior to a trial at which child victims would have to testify. This was the primary 
basis of Anderson's wife's expressed concern in this case. (See Joint Exhibit 1, 
disc 1, 16:40 - 17:45, 19:00 - 20:00; disc 2, 4: 15 - 4:45.) A family member's 
expression of her desire that a case be settled does not require a district court to 
exercise its discretion in favor of granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
Finally, the written and recorded communications between Anderson and 
his wife that are part of the record in this case do not reveal any overbearing 
influence by Anderson's wife on Anderson's decision-making that would justify 
the withdrawal of his plea. Instead, the record demonstrates that it was 
Anderson who attempted to coerce his wife to his own benefit. While in pretrial 
custody, Anderson wrote a letter asking his wife to "fight to conceal the truth from 
[the state]." (PSI attachment, p.115.) Anderson asked his wife to tell his attorney 
that his daughters were "determined to withdraw their testimony." (ld.) In a 
recorded jailhouse conversation, Anderson accused his wife of not informing his 
daughters of the consequences of testifying against him, and expressed his 
belief that the state was engaged in a "scorched earth policy" that would 
implicate both of them. (Joint exhibit 1, disc 1, 7:45 - 9:25, 11 :35 - 11 :45.) He 
also cited her act of handing over his letters to the state as contributing to the 
severity of the sentence he faced. (Joint exhibit 1, disc 1, 6:30 - 7:00, 18:20-
18:45.) 
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The record supports the district court's determination that Anderson failed 
to carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was involuntary or that 
there existed any other just cause for withdrawal of the plea. Anderson has thus 
failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
II. 
Anderson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Anderson contends that the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a 40-year unified sentence with 15 years fixed upon his guilty plea to 
lewd conduct with a minor under 16, with a sentencing enhancement for being a 
repeat sexual offender. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.) Anderson has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion considering the objectives of sentencing, the 
nature of his crimes, and his status as a repeat sexual offender. 
Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397,401 (2007). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion, 
the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
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sentence is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736,170 P.3d at 401. To establish 
that the sentence is excessive, Anderson must demonstrate that reasonable 
minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the 
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 
kL Idaho appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be 
the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 
980 P.2d 552 (1999). 
Pursuant to the I.C. § 19-2520G repeat sexual offender sentencing 
enhancement, to which Anderson pled guilty (R., p.117), the district court was 
required to impose a minimum fixed sentence of 15 years. State v. Ephraim, 152 
Idaho 176, 178-179,267 P.3d 1291, 1293-1294 (Ct. App. 2011). The district 
court imposed this mandatory minimum 15-year fixed sentence. (R., pp.117-
118.) Because the district court had no authority to impose a lesser fixed 
sentence, Anderson may only challenge the district court's 25-year indeterminate 
sentence. A review of the record reveals that this indeterminate sentence was 
appropriate. 
Anderson's sexual victimization of his own daughters dates back to at 
least 1996. In 1998, Anderson confessed to fondling the groin area of his oldest 
daughter, E.A., and that this abuse started when E.A. was approximately 2 Yz 
years old. (PSI attachment, pp.74, 78-86.) Anderson pled guilty to lewd conduct 
and the district court imposed a unified eight-year sentence with three years 
fixed. (PSI attachment, pp.93-95.) Anderson completed sexual offender 
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treatment through SANE Solutions, and a "strict protection plan" was put in place 
upon his return to his residence with his three daughters. (PSI, pp.3, 11.) 
Despite his treatment and the implementation of a protection plan, 
Anderson began sexually abusing D.A., his middle daughter, within two or three 
years of satisfying his prior lewd conduct sentence. (PSI attachment, p.51.) 
Anderson subsequently abused his youngest daughter as well. (PSI attachment, 
pp.45-46.) As discussed in Section I, Anderson has demonstrated a willingness 
to utilize his wife to attempt to cover up his criminal behavior. A lengthy 
indeterminate prison sentence is more than appropriate to ensure some type of 
meaningful community supervision over Anderson's relationships with children he 
may father or have contact with in the future, if and when he is paroled. 
The fact that Anderson believes that the district court should have 
imposed a shorter indeterminate sentence does not establish an abuse of the 
district court's discretion. Because Anderson has failed to establish the district 
court abused its sentencing discretion, he is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Anderson's sentence 
and the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 17th day of July, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON 
\ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of July, 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MARK W. OLSON \ 
Deputy Attorney General 
MWO/pm 
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